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GIVING VOICE TO THE PRECARIOUSLY
EMPLOYED? MAPPING AND EXPLORING
CHANNELS OF WORKER VOICE IN
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
REGULATION
ERIC TUCKER
1. Introduction
Most contemporary occupational health and safety (OHS) regimes
incorporate some arrangement to facilitate worker voice. This policy is
based on a belief that worker voice desirable for two reasons. First, there is
a normative argument that the people who bear the risk of being injured,
made ill or dying from unsafe and unhealthy work ought to have a say about
the regulation of hazardous working conditions. This moral intuition led
James Ham to assert in his influential Report of the Royal Commission on
the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines that “the employee has the
legitimate right, under the principle of natural justice, to appraise the
conditions under which he works and to express his views on their
adequacy.” 1 Second, there is a positive claim, well supported by empirical
research, that OHS systems providing for worker voice produce better
outcomes than those that do not. 2 In an ideal world, a policy that is
normatively appealing and would improve OHS outcomes would be widely
embraced. But this was not the case for worker voice in OHS. Workers had
to struggle to obtain voice rights and the extent of those rights tended to
reflect the strength of worker mobilization and bargaining and political
power.

1

Ham, J. 1976. “Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of
Workers in Mines,” Ministry of the Attorney General, 146.
2
Nichols, T., and D. Walters. 2007. Worker Representation and Workplace Health
and Safety. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
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Given the timing of the struggle in the late-1960s, and its location
principally in mines and factories, 3 it is not surprising that policy-makers
and worker advocates designed worker voice mechanisms on the
assumption that their target population was comprised of full-time workers
having more or less secure jobs with their current employers. This is
manifestly no longer true posing a serious challenge to the efficacy of the
ways worker voice has been institutionalized and the OHS regimes that
assume worker voice is working. The purpose of this chapter is to explore
this challenge and to examine various initiatives that have been suggested to
meet it.
I begin this chapter by briefly describing the contours of the changing
labour market and the vulnerabilities it is producing. Following that, I
describe some earlier mapping models of OHS regulation that incorporated
worker participation as a critical dimension, but that did not try to identify
the channels in which worker voice might be exercised. I then produce a
map of those channels, based on three variables: the subject of worker
voice, the object of worker voice and the audience for worker voice. The
chapter then discusses existing laws facilitating and protecting worker
voice, paying particular attention to the problems that arise when they are
applied to precarious workers. It concludes by considering recent
developments that may point the way toward new strategies and tactics for
amplifying worker voice in the context of today’s labour market. Although
my central case is Ontario, Canada, I draw on a broader literature that
indicates the problems experienced here are representative of a more
general phenomenon.

2. Growing Labour Market Insecurity
There is now a large body of research that clearly demonstrates the
growth of labour market insecurity in the late-twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries. The basic contours of the story are well known. 4 In the
3

MacDowell, L. S. 2012. “The Elliot Lake Uranium Miners’ Battle to Gain
Occupational Health and Safety Improvements, 1950-1980,” Labour/Le Travail
69:91-118; Storey, R. 2005. “Activism and the Making of Occupational Health and
Safety Law in Ontario, 1960s-1980” Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 3:4168.
4
The literature is vast. For a small sample, see: Lewchuk, W., M. Clarke and A. de
Wolff. 2011. Working Without Commitments. Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press; Standing, G. 2011. The Precariat. London: Bloomsbury
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aftermath of World War II workers in most western industrial capitalist
democracies influenced their national governments to adopt Keynesian and
social-democratic policies that partially decommodified labour power.
Welfare-state provisions loosened worker dependence on labour markets
and, in response, employers in core economic sectors made commitments to
employees that went beyond their short-term economic interests. Workers in
these sectors could expect to be hired into full-time jobs that would continue
until retirement except for economic or disciplinary reasons, and that layoffs would be governed by notice, seniority and due process protections.
Employer-provided pensions and other benefits were also normally part of
the compensation package. Many of these workers were unionized, but even
those who were not enjoyed forms of security comparable to unionized
firms as a union avoidance strategy. 5 These kinds of arrangements have
been appropriately labeled as the standard employment relationship (SER).
Since the early 1970s employers have been retreating from the SER
which came to be viewed as a barrier to renewed profitability. 6 In part, this
was accomplished by changing the form of work contract, evidenced by the
growth of part-time, temporary and self employment. As well, employers
increasingly obtained labour from temporary employment agencies through
leasing arrangements that produced a tripartite relationship in which legal
responsibility for complying with labor and employment law was divided
between the agency and the client. Of course, this has not been the fate of
all workers, but even for those with full-time permanent jobs, labour market
insecurity was increased by downsizing, outsourcing and contracting out
into domestic or global supply chains. As a result, many workers faced the
risk that their present job might end and that the jobs they might get in the
future would be more demanding, less secure, and lower paid. Finally, there
has been a substantial increase in temporary foreign worker programs that
enable Canadian to more easily access global labour markets. The workers
in the lower skill categories are particularly vulnerable because their
Academic; Vosko, L. 2010. Managing the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; and Vosko, L. ed. 2006. Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour
Market Insecurity in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press.
5
Storey, R. 1983. “Unionization versus Corporate Welfare: The Dofasco Way,”
Labour/Le Travail 12, 7-42.
6
Again, the literature is vast. A few key works include: Kotz, D. M., T. McDonagh.,
and M. Reich. eds. 2010. Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises. New York:
Cambridge University Press; and Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of NeoLiberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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immigration status is tied to an employment contract with a particular
employer. 7 In short, labour market insecurity was manufactured to create a
social structure of accumulation that permitted the owners of capital to
extract a greater share of socially produced wealth for their benefit by
reducing their commitments to workers. 8
At the same time, employers also pressed government to abandon the
Keynesian and social-democratic policy prescriptions. Internationally, this
included entering into free-trade agreements that facilitated the
globalization of production, while domestically cutting welfare spending
and pursuing labour market policies and laws that facilitated flexible work
arrangements to meet employers’ requirements, reducing the floor of
minimum standards and weakening collective bargaining laws. As well,
governments were also pressed to reduce the public sector, often through
privatization often entailed substituting lower paying and less secure private
sector jobs for the unionized public sectors jobs they replaced. Finally,
remaining public sector jobs were subject to private sector management
techniques aimed at increasing productivity and reducing labour costs. 9As a
result, public sectors jobs also became less secure.
The implications of these changes of OHS have been well documented
elsewhere. 10 The focus here is on their impact on worker voice in OHS
regulation.
7

Sargeant, M., and E. Tucker. 2010. “Layers of Vulnerability in Occupational
Health and Safety for Migrant Workers: Case Studies from Canada and the UK,
Policy and Practice,” Occupational Health and Safety 7, No. 2:51-73; Fudge, J., and
F. MacPhail. 2009. “The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada: LowSkilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labour,” Comparative Labor Law
and Policy Journal 31, No. 1:5-46.
8
Bieler, A. 2012. “Neo-liberal Globalisation, the Manufacturing of Insecurity and
the Power of Labour,” Labor History 53, No. 2:274-79.
9
Huws, U. 2012. “Crisis as Capitalist Opportunity: The New Accumulation through
Public Service Commodification,” Socialist Register 2012: The Crisis and the Left
48, 64-84.
10
For example, see: Quinlan, M. 1999. “The Implications of Labour Market
Restructuring in Industrialized Societies for Occupational Health and Safety,”
Economic and Industrial Democracy 20, No. 3:427-60; Bohle, P., and M.
Quinlan.2008. “Under Pressure, Out of Control, or Home Alone? Reviewing
Research and Policy Debates on the Occupational Health and Safety Effects of
Outsourcing and Home-Based Work,” International Journal of Health Services 38,
No. 3:489-523; and Quinlan, M., and E. Underhill. 2011. “How Precarious
Employment Affects Health and Safety at Work: The Case of Temporary Foreign
Workers,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 66, No. 3:397-421.
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3. Mapping Worker Voice in OHS Regulation
In previous work I mapped different ways in which workers could be
written into OHS regimes based on the relative strength of worker
participation and direct state protection. My aim was to describe worker the
variety OHS citizenship regimes rights in industrial capitalist states. That
matrix can readily be adapted to describe models of OHS regulation, as I
have done below in Fig.2-1.
Fig. 2-1. Models of OHS Regulation

These models are not just ideal types, but accurately describe different
approaches to OHS regulation, and can be used to map the historical
trajectory of OHS regulation within a particular jurisdiction and well as to
compare regimes in different jurisdictions. 11

11

Tucker, E. 2007. “Remapping Worker Citizenship Regimes in Contemporary
Health and Safety Regulation,” International Journal of Health Services 31, No.
1:145-70; Tucker, E. 2003. “The Politics of Occupational Health and Safety in a
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For example, the historical development of OHS regulation in Ontario,
Canada begins in the mid-nineteenth century when railway and industrial
workers sued their employers for compensation as a result of work related
injuries. Courts faced with these suits adopted the common law to support a
regime of market regulation, by insisting that OHS conditions were to be
determined by the contract of employment and not the imposition of legal
standards. Freedom of contract was to prevail.
The reality for most workers, whether they were children, women or
men, was that they could not meaningfully exercise voice in the labour
market by negotiating with their employers over hazardous conditions. The
market was neither free nor fair. Worker dissatisfaction gained political
traction and this led to the enactment of work safety legislation in the last
two decades of the nineteenth century. The enforcement of these safety
laws, however, was problematic and the result was a weakly enforced
regime of direct state regulation that did not produce levels of safety
significantly better than the market. Notwithstanding its deficiencies, this
regime was subsequently stabilized by the enactment of no-fault workers’
compensation in the first decades of the twentieth century. Not only did
workers’ compensation provide financial relief to injured workers and their
families, but it probably increased the cost of accidents to employers and
prompted employers and employer associations to invest in safety
improvements. Worker voice, however, remained muted. Individual
workers may have acted as informants for inspectors and unions
participated in lobbying efforts to strengthen OHS and workers’
compensation laws, but in an era when unionization rates in most industries
were low, union influence was limited.
After World War II, as part of the embrace of Keynesianism and social
democracy, union density increased and some unions became more active in
OHS issues. Some collective agreements required a joint health and safety
committee (JHSC) and, more generally, arbitrators found that workers had a
right to refuse unsafe work without being disciplined for insubordination.
This produced a regime of industrial pluralist regulation for a segment of
the labour force covered by collective agreements..
Finally, in the last decades of the twentieth century, a new wave of
legislation was enacted giving all workers participatory rights and
strengthening direct state regulation, particularly with respect to
occupational health hazards. These developments moved Ontario in the
Cold Climate: Diverging Trends in Worker Protection and Participation in Canada,
1985-2000,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 58, No. 3:395-426.
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direction of social democratic regulation, although of a relatively weak
kind. 12 At the time, it was the enhancement of worker voice that was seen as
the greatest innovation.
So while the conceptual map was useful for historical and comparative
analysis of OHS regimes, like all models it contains certain limitations that
have become more apparent in the course of exploring new channels of
voice for precarious workers. First, the model assumes that the space for
worker voice is in the employer’s management system. It does not
contemplate worker participation in the enforcement system. Second, it
assumes that worker voice will be exercised collectively. These limitations
were understandable at the time. Health and safety activists and others were
engaged in a political project to enhance collective worker voice at the point
of production, the more radical among them arguing that worker control
should be the goal. 13 However, this political project may have reached its
limits, especially in the new world of work where worker voice in the
workplace is losing strength, making it necessary to explore whether
alternative channels for voice, including voice in public enforcement,
provide greater opportunities for improving worker safety.
In order to broaden the discussion, here I map the channels of worker
voice based on three variables: subject, object and audience. The subject of
voice refers to whether we are concerned with individual or collective
worker voice. Regulatory regimes in OHS typically provide for both,
although in varying degrees. The second variable is the object of voice,
which refers to whether worker voice is directed at correcting hazardous
conditions in the workplace, whether or not they violate the law, or
reforming the laws and policies that determine what practices are legal or
accepted by the employer```. The third dimension is the audience. Here the
question is whether worker voice is directed at the employer or at the state,
opening up for discussion the role of worker voice in direct state regulation.
The combination of these three variables produces Table 2-1.

12

Tucker, E. Remapping Worker Citizenship Regimes in Contemporary Health and
Safety Regulation, cit. Also see: Tucker, E. 1990. Administering Danger: The Law
and Politics of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press; and Tucker, E. 1992. “Worker Participation in
Health and Safety Regulation: Lessons from Sweden,” Studies in Political Economy
37:95-127.
13
Poole, M. 1986. Towards a New Industrial Democracy. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
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Table 2-1. Channels of W`orker Voice in OHS Regulation
`
`````

While some of these channels are largely theoretical possibilities, most exist
in practice. In what follows, I discuss each channel of worker voice,
including its legal entrenchment, its use by “standard” workers and its use
by precarious or vulnerable workers.

4. Exploring Channels of Worker Voice
4.1. Individual Worker Voice—Hazardous Conditions
Beginning from the left, I start with individual voice raising concerns
about hazardous working conditions directly with the employer. By law,
individual workers have a right, indeed perhaps a duty, to raise concerns
about hazardous workplace conditions with their employer. For example,
under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), ss. 28(1)(c)
and (d) impose a duty on workers to report to an employer or a supervisor
defects in any equipment or protective devices or contraventions of the Act
and Regulations. 14 There is also a legally protected right to refuse unsafe
work when the worker has reason to believe that the equipment, a physical
condition or workplace violence is likely to endanger the worker or another
person. Workers are required to report the circumstances of the refusal to a
supervisor and the employer, and employers are prohibited from retaliating
against workers for acting in compliance with the Act or seeking its
enforcement. 15
It hardly bears repeating that this is a fundamentally important channel
for worker voice. Workers’ eyes are often the first to see hazardous
14
15

Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1.; [OHSA].
OHSA, cit., ss. 43(3)(4) and 50(1).
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situations and if the employer does not adequately resolve reasonable
worker concerns about safety, workers should have both the freedom to
refuse unsafe work and a right not to suffer adverse consequences for doing
so. Yet the existence of legal guarantees is only the first step for making this
channel of voice effective. There must also be an institutional infrastructure
in place to make these rights meaningful. Workers must not only have
knowledge of their rights and of the hazards in their workplaces, but they
must also feel secure that they can freely exercise voice without employer
or co-worker retaliation. 16
Garry Gray has identified three kinds of inter-related constraints on the
individual exercise of safety rights: cultural, personal and structural. 17
Cultural constraints refer to the prevailing set of attitudes, beliefs, symbols,
practices and behaviours in local work settings that may discourage
individual workers from reporting hazards or refusing unsafe work. For
example, if the prevalent view of management is that individual workers
should be responsible for avoiding risks that are present, rather than it being
the responsibility of the management to remove those risks, then workers
are more likely to feel reluctant to report or refuse hazards situations unless
there is substantial co-worker support. Personal constraints refer to
individual circumstances that may weaken a worker’s ability or willingness
to exercise safety rights. For example, workers will be more or less
knowledgeable about safety risks. They will also be more or less willing to
tolerate confrontation depending both on their personal characteristics and
on their security at work, which in turn may depend on their place in the
workplace hierarchy and their level of job security. Finally, structural
constraints refer to the unequal power relations within work places that
often make workers reluctant to challenge their employers’ authority
regardless of their legal rights. The greater the inequality, the more
constrained workers are likely to be in acting as protagonists in defense of
their own health and safety. Moreover, the structural constraints are also

16

Johnstone, R., M. Quinlan., and D. Walters. 2005. “Statutory Occupational Health
and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern Labour Market,” Journal of
Industrial Relations 47, No. 1:93-116.
17
Gray, G. C. 2011. “Constraints to Upholding Workplace Safety Laws and
Regulations within Organizations,” Droit et Société 77, No. 1:57-68. Also see:
Feldman, Y., and O. Lobel. 2011. “Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of
Employee Reporting Systems,” in Explaining Compliance, eds. Parker, C., and V.
Lehmann Nielsen., (UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), 26384.
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likely to shape the cultural and personal factors influencing individual
exercises of worker rights.
In the face of these constraints, it is not surprising that a growing body
of research is finding that even among workers in a SER the voice channels
of hazard reporting and, even more so, of work refusals are obstructed.
Beginning with hazard reporting, Gray’s ethnographic study of workers in
an Ontario factory reported they were often silent about recognized hazards
in their workplace. 18 Two other surveys also found significant worker
reluctance to report. The first, a survey of unionized workers in south
western Ontario, found that close to one-half did not report a significant
hazard and one-third expressed concerns that reporting hazards or injuries
would negatively affect their future employment. 19 This result was
confirmed by a second survey of Ontario workers in the Toronto-Hamilton
corridor. It found that about one-third of respondents reported that raising a
health and safety issue at work would negatively affect future
employment. 20 The study also reported that when responses were
disaggregated between workers who reported that they were exposed to
hazardous conditions and those who were not, close to two-thirds of those
who were exposed to hazards reported that raising concerns would
negatively affect their future employment. Presumably this discrepancy is
explained by the fact that workers who are actually exposed to hazardous
working conditions thought more concretely about the consequences of
reporting than those who were not.
When we turn to the question of work refusals, which of course entails
going beyond reporting and defying the employer who still requires the
work to be done, it is expected that workers will be more reluctant to
exercise voice, notwithstanding legal guarantees against retaliation.
Research confirms this expectation even among workers in an SER. As with
18

Gray, G. C. 2002. “A Socio-Legal Ethnography of the Right to Refuse Dangerous
Work,” Studies in Law, Politics and Society 24, No. 2:133-69.
19
Hall, A. 2010. “To Report or Not to Report Injuries: Worker Rationales and
Workplace Constraints,” Paper presented at the LOARC Teach-in, Internal
Responsibility Thirty Years Later: Not Yet Healthy and Still Not Safe, McMaster
University, Hamilton, Ontario, May 2010; Hall, A., and S.S. Phillips. 2011. “Injury
and Hazard Reporting in the Context of Precarious Employment,” Paper presented at
the Canadian Sociological Association Meeting, St. Thomas University/University
of New Brunswick, New Brunswick, May 2011.
20
Lewchuk, W. “The Limits of Voice: Who is Afraid of their Health and Safety
Rights?,” Paper presented at the Voice at Work North American Meeting, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, March 2012.
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reporting, the right to refuse will only be exercised when there are
institutional arrangements in place to support its exercise. In Ontario, the
overwhelming majority of work refusals are by unionized workers who
have the security of a collective agreement that provides them with
protection against arbitrary discharge and discipline and the support of a
union that has the resources to bring a grievance or a labour board
complaint on their behalf. 21 Yet unionization alone is not enough to provide
workers with security. When complaints about retaliation are made, labour
boards and arbitrators have tended to interpret narrowly the scope of the
right to refuse work as subordinate to the employers’ right to manage. As a
result, workers may find it difficult to vindicate their legal rights. Even
with the support of their unions. But other structural constraints may be
even more powerful. Unionized workers are not immune from economic
lay-offs or plant closings so that during periods of economic contraction
workers may be extremely reluctant to engage in militant or disruptive
behaviour and may find little support from their co-workers, even if the
circumstances warrant a legal work refusal. 22
To this point, our discussion of reporting and refusing hazards by
individual workers to the employer has focused on workers in SERs. That
is, we have focused on the kind of workers who were in the contemplation
of policy makers when these rights were enacted in the 1970s. Yet from the
beginning commentators noted the limits of worker voice in the internal
responsibility or safety management systems that were being constructed to
comply with the law and since that time the structural constraints under
21

Tucker, E. 1986. “The Persistence of Market Regulation of Occupational Health
and Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism,” in Essays in Labour Relations Law, ed.
England, G., (Don Mills, ON: CCH) 219-262; O’Grady, J. 2000. “Joint Health and
Safety Committees: Finding a Balance,” in Injury and the New World of Work, ed.
Sullivan, T., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press) 162-97.
22
Harcourt, M., and S. Harcourt. 2000. “When Can an Employee Refuse Unsafe
Work and Expect to be Protected from Discipline? Evidence from Canada,”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, No. 4:684-703; Renaud, M., and C. St.Jacques. 1988. “The Right to Refuse in Quebec: Five Year Evolution of a New
Mode of Expressing Risk,” International Journal of Health Services 18, No. 3:40117; Walters, V. et al. 1995. “Judgments of Legitimacy regarding Occupational
Health and Safety: A Report on a Canadian Study” in Corporate Crime:
Contemporary Debates, Pearce, F., and L. Snider, (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press) 284-301; Gray, G. C. Ethnography, cit. The precipitous decline in strike rates
in most advanced capitalist economies further attests to this phenomenon. See:
Dribbusch, H., D. Lyddon, K.I. Vandaele, and S. Van der Velden, eds., 2007. Strikes
Around the World, 1968-2005. Amsterdam: Aksant.
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which those systems operate have tended to undermine the conditions for
effective worker voice generally. 23
It is not surprising, therefore, that when we examine the individual voice
channel for precarious workers a small but growing body of research has
found that it is unlikely to be effective. First, a prerequisite for reporting or
refusing is that the worker is aware of the hazard. Temporary workers,
contract workers or self-employed workers whose tenure at any particular
work location is liable to be short are less likely to have an opportunity to
gain local knowledge about the particular hazards in their present worksites
and many employers will not be inclined to invest adequately in training to
provide it directly. For example, Aronsson’s study of contingent workers in
Sweden found that non-permanent workers more frequently reported feeling
they lacked sufficient work-environment knowledge and training than
permanent workers and that their non-permanent status made it more
difficult for them to raise concerns and get their viewpoint heard. 24
Second, almost by definition, precarious workers are less secure than
those in an SER. As a result, their perceived cost of exercising OHS rights
is likely to be higher, reducing the likelihood they will do so. Lewchuk’s
study, referred to earlier, found that workers with only moderate security
were more than twice as likely as workers with high security to express the
fear that reporting an OHS concern would negatively impact future
employment, while workers in the high precarity category were seven times
more likely to express this fear. 25
If precarious workers are less able to recognize hazards and are more
fearful that raising OHS concerns will negatively impact future
employment, then we can also safely assume that work refusals will be rare
indeed. To my knowledge, however, there are no empirical studies that have
specifically examined work refusals by precarious workers, although in
Gray’s ethnography he reports that when he refused unsafe work
management replaced him with a young female university student from
another department who, as a temporary worker, presumably had less
understanding of the danger and was less secure in her job. 26

23

See: Haines, T., and V. Walters. 1988. “Workers’ Use and Knowledge of the
‘Internal Responsibility System’: Limits to Participation in Occupational Health and
Safety,” Canadian Public Policy 14, Mo. 3:411-23.
24
Aronsson, G. 1999. “Contingent Workers and Health and Safety,” Work,
Employment and Society 13, No.3:439-60.
25
Lewchuk, W. op. cit.
26
Gray, G. C. Socio-Legal, op. cit., 154-58.
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4.2 Collective Workplace Voice—Hazardous Conditions
Because of the deficiencies of individual voice for workers generally, let
alone precarious workers, health and safety reforms of the 1970s and 80s
put greater emphasis on creating institutional arrangements for collective
worker voice to foster communication between workers and employers and
between workers and OHS officials. Here our focus is on JHSCs and HSRs,
beginning first with their place in the employer’s safety management
system.
Again, taking Ontario as our example, with some exceptions the OHSA
currently requires the establishment of an JHSC at workplaces where twenty
or more workers are regularly employed and the appointment of an HSR in
a workplace with fewer than twenty but more than five regularly employed
workers. If the workers are represented by a trade union, then the union
appoints the HSRs or the worker representatives on JHSCs (who will also
be called HSRs). Otherwise they are to be elected by the workers with nonmanagerial functions. HSRs play a crucial role in communicating OHS
concerns to the employer. By law, HSRs are entitled to training on paid
work time, they are entitled to get OHS information from the employer and
they have a duty to conduct periodic examinations of the workplace. HSRs
can make recommendations to the employer directly, or to the JHSC, which
then makes recommendations to the employer and the employer must
respond in writing to these recommendations. HSRs also assist individual
workers. For example, during a work refusal (which is an individual and not
a group right), HSRs are to be called to participate in the internal
investigation of the refusing worker’s concern. 27
In one form or another, these arrangements exist in most advanced
industrial economies and while differences are salient in terms of their
effectiveness it is not my concern here to enter into that discussion. 28
Rather, I want to emphasize that the common goal of these reforms was to
require the employer to establish a participatory OHS management system
in which worker representatives would bring worker concerns to the
attention of the employer and be involved in their prompt and appropriate
resolution; in short, an effective channel for collective worker voice to the
employer.
27

OHSA, cit. ss. 8, 9 & 43(4).
Nichols, T., and D. Walters. 2007. Worker Representation and Workplace Health
and Safety. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
28
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There is now a large literature on the effectiveness of HSRs and JHSCs
that can be briefly summarized. It is well established that merely mandating
JHSCs and HSRs is not sufficient to create effective channels for collective
worker voice, although a strong legislative steer is necessary. The
effectiveness of JHSCs and HSRs depends on the presence of a number of
other inter-related conditions including an effective system of external
inspection and control, senior management commitment to OHS and
participatory arrangements, worker representative access to information and
training, and a degree of worker economic security and power. 29
There is also ample, although not uncontroverted evidence that a trade
union presence increases the effectiveness of collective worker voice in
OHS. To the extent this is found it may be because a union presence helps
strengthen the other conditions supporting worker voice. For example,
unions may provide valuable OHS training and reduce the cost of obtaining
access to information. They may also provide worker representatives with
greater job security. Finally, in a unionized workplace the employer maybe
more used to and accepting of participatory arrangements in relation to
shop-floor matters like OHS. But of course, the mere presence of a union is
no guarantee collective worker voice will be effective. Unions may not
make OHS a priority, they certainly cannot protect the bargaining unit
against economic lay-offs or plant shutdowns, and employers may actively
resist union involvement in decision-making rather than accept it. Indeed,
some recent research has found that in the face of declining union densities
and power, and growing employer resistance to collective bargaining, the
channels for collective worker voice, even for workers in SERs in unionized
sectors, are becoming blocked. 30
29
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In light of these findings, it is not surprising that researchers are
generally pessimistic about the prospect of collective workplace voice for
precarious workers. First, there are some basic questions around how or
whether precarious workers of various kinds even fit into the statutory
scheme for collective representation. Some arrangements are more
problematic than others. In respect of independent contracting, in Ontario
and many other jurisdictions employers owe a duty to protect workers, not
just employees, so that an employer does not avoid OHS obligations by
having independent contractors performing work on the employer’s
premises. Moreover, if those contractors are “regularly employed” then they
are to be counted for the purposes of calculating whether a JHSC or an HSR
is required. Just recently the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the term
“regularly employed” should be given an expansive meaning so that a
company that dispatched owner-operators was required to have a JHSC. 31
The application of the law to temporary agency workers is more
problematic. The agency is considered the employer for the purposes of
workers’ compensation but the client is also the employer for the purposes
of OHSA. If temps are regularly employed by the client then they will count
toward calculating whether an HSR or a JHSC is required, but the agency
itself will not be required to have HSRs or a JHSC, even though it may have
hundreds or even thousands of employees because they are not regularly
employed at the agency’s workplace. 32
Beyond the question of mismatches between statutory provisions and
precarious working arrangements lies the issue of the effectiveness of
participatory arrangements even when they are required. As we noted,
research has pointed to three significant factors associated with successful
collective voice in workplace OHS: worker knowledge, worker
31
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32
For a more detailed discussions of mismatches between statutory provisions and
labour market changes, see Lippel, K. 2006. “Precarious Employment and
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Quebec,” in Precarious Employment:
Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada, ed. Vosko, L., (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 241-55; Lippel, K., et al. 2001. “Legal
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Health and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern Labour Market,”
Journal of Industrial Relations 47, No. 1:93-116.
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empowerment and employer commitment. As we have already noted,
researchers consistently report that precarious workers are less likely to
have OHS knowledge and more likely to feel vulnerable to suffering
adverse consequences for raising OHS concerns. Moreover, precarious
workers face considerable obstacles to collective action. Not only are there
serious questions about when so-called self-employed workers qualify as
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining law, but other groups of
precarious workers whose employment status is not in question encounter
other legal problems, including the question of who is the employer for
collective bargaining purposes. 33 Of course, collective action outside the
structure of formal unions is possible, and we will return later to discuss
some developments in this regard, but these arrangements generally do not
provide workers with the ability to act collectively at the workplace level.
Finally, we might ask whether it is likely that employers who choose to
meet their labour requirement through precarious workers will be
committed to participatory management structures. To ask the question is to
answer it; employers who adopt these arrangements are motivated to
reduce, if not eliminate, commitments to workers, and so it would be
surprising to find them embracing participatory approaches to OHS
management. 34

4.3. Individual Worker Voice and the State—Hazardous
Conditions
An alternative to raising concerns about hazardous conditions with the
employer is to raise them with state officials, typically with health and
safety inspectors. We consider individual complaints first. Historically,
individual worker complaints were the first channel of worker voice after
protective legislation was enacted in the nineteenth century. In the early
years of OHS regulation, complaints were often made in writing, under
pseudonyms, to prevent employers from identifying the source. 35 Under
33
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present law, because of its emphasis on the development of internal
responsibility systems, individual workers are not under a duty to report
violations to an inspector, but only to their employer. Indeed, in the first
years of enforcement activity under this new regime, the government’s
desire to make the internal responsibility system work led the Ontario
Ministry of Labour to discourage worker OHS complaints to government
until they had gone through the internal responsibility system. 36 In more
recent years, the Ministry has shifted its priorities and has expanded its
enforcement role. In any event, workers are legally free to make complaints
to government and, as noted above, individual workers are protected against
retaliation for seeking enforcement of the Act. The Act also requires
inspectors communicate with workers. Where there are no worker
representatives (discussed infra.), inspectors are required to “endeavour to
consult” with a reasonable number of individual workers when conducting a
physical workplace inspection. 37
Yet the fact that workers have the right to raise OHS concerns with
government and government inspectors have a duty to consult with workers
when conducting inspections does not guarantee that this channel of worker
voice will be open. As is the case with reporting hazards to employers,
workers must be aware of the existence of the hazard and feel secure before
they will exercise their right to report to government. David Weil and
Amanda Pyles constructed a very useful model to explain the factors that
influence individual reporting behaviour based on the perceived benefits
and costs to the individual of doing so. Costs include both information costs
(acquiring information about hazards and legal standards) and the potential
costs of retaliation, while the benefit is improved health and safety. While
we are strictly concerned with individuals, Weil and Pyles also note that the
benefit of improved health and safety is likely to be a public good in the
sense that it will benefit a larger group of workers. This creates the
potential for under utilization of the individual right to complain because of
free-rider problems. Individuals may chose not to incur the costs of
complaining in the hope that another worker who is exposed to the same
hazard will do so. 38
36
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Empirical studies of individual complaints to enforcement officials are
scarce. Indeed, I have found only one that examines OHS complaints to
government. Weil and Pyles’ study of complaint behaviour by US workers
between 2001 and 2004 found that the incidence of worker complaints was
exceedingly low - 17 complaints for every 100,000 workers. Although rates
between industries varied considerably, there was little correlation between
injury complaint rates, injury levels (especially among industries with high
injury rates) and compliance rates. Industries with high injury and noncompliance rates often had low complaint rates.
To my knowledge there are no studies specifically examining the
propensity of precarious workers to raise OHS concerns with government
officials. 39 However many of the same factors that inhibit workers from
voicing OHS concerns to their employers would also be operative here.
Precarious workers are less likely to be aware of site-specific hazards and, if
move between different industries or occupations, of more general hazards.
They are less likely to receive adequate training. Additionally, they are
likely to feel more vulnerable to suffer adverse employment consequences if
they complain and less supported in challenging retaliatory actions. Finally,
to my knowledge, OHS inspectors in Canada have not been instructed to
seek out and consult with precarious workers during scheduled OHS
inspections. 40

4.4. Collective Worker Voice and the State—Hazardous
Conditions
JHSCs and HSRs not only have a role to play in raising OHS concerns
with the employer; they are also are empowered to engage with the external
responsibility system of the state. For example, in Ontario OHSA provides
that HSRs are entitled to accompany inspectors during their inspection visits
on paid time. Copies of any order issued by the inspector are to be provided
to the HSR. Where the inspector issues a stop-work order, a condition of the
employer being able to resume the stopped work is that an HSR signs off on
39
Lewchuk’s study, op. cit. did not distinguish between complaints to inspectors and
complaints to the employer, so to some extent his findings might provide some
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that precarious workers are less likely to
complain to OHS inspectors.
40
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a report that the employer has complied with the order. 41 In Australia, five
of nine health and safety statutes empower HSRs to issue provisional
improvement notices and four give HSRs power to direct that dangerous
work cease. 42 These are powers reserved to state enforcement officials in
most jurisdictions. Beyond formal statutory arrangements, HSRs also can
play an important role in initiating complaint investigations. In an older
study, I found that in Ontario complaint inspections disproportionately
occurred at unionized workplaces. While in part this may be because
unionized workers perform more hazardous work than non-unionized
workers, it is also likely that HSRs in unionized workplaces were more
willing to make complaints that triggered inspections than HSRs in nonunion workplaces. An American study by Weil reached a similar
conclusion. He found that worker voice in unionized firms resulted in those
firms being more frequently inspected, facing greater scrutiny on those
inspections and paying higher fines if found to be in violation than nonunionized workplaces. 43 However, the union advantage should not be
overstated in an era of growing economic insecurity for all workers. Worker
representatives will be reluctant to complain to inspectors about hazardous
conditions if they fear it may result in lay-offs or shutdowns.
In light of what has already been said about the weakness of collective
work voice for precarious workers in communicating with their employers,
there is little to add regarding its role for engaging the state. Although I am
not aware of empirical studies that examine how well collective voice
mechanisms operate for precarious workers in attracting state protection, it
is likely that mismatches between statutory provisions and precarious work
arrangements, decreased ability to make effective use of JHSCs and HSRs,
and greater vulnerability more generally conspire to undermine this channel
of worker voice.
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4.5. Individual and Collective Worker Voice—Workplace and
State OHS Policy
In this section, I am only briefly mentioning individual voice for the
obvious reason that individual voice in respect of OHS policy is not a well
developed channel or, for that matter, one that is likely to develop. For
example, in Ontario employers are not legally required to consult with
individual workers on matters of OHS policy. Of course, some employers
may solicit individual worker involvement in OHS management, but there
is no evidence that it happens generally, either in large establishments or in
smaller workplaces where collective worker voice is not required and where
researchers have found there are significant challenges to promoting
individual employee participation. 44 As well, individual worker voice in
government OHS policy development is also not a major feature of
contemporary OHS regulation. Certainly, individual workers are free to
make submissions to government during consultations on regulatory and
policy matters, but outside of occasional commissions of inquiry that hold
local hearings government typically does not build institutional mechanisms
to encourage or facilitate individual worker voice. Indeed, where collective
worker voice was historically weak, such as in agriculture, and employers
objected to permitting third-parties such as worker advocacy groups to
speak for unorganized workers, worker voice virtually disappeared from
government investigations. 45
On the other hand, collective worker voice in OHS policy development
at both the workplace and state level has been, to varying degrees, actively
promoted. As we noted earlier, in contemporary OHS legislation there was
an underlying commitment to the development of worker voice within the
firm that did not sharply distinguish between reporting hazards and making
recommendations for improved OHS performance. For example, in Ontario
HSRs and JHSCs were given a mandate to make recommendations to the
employer and later employers were required to respond to their
44
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recommendations with either a timetable for implementing them or reasons
for not implementing. 46 However, there were substantial disagreements over
the scope of worker voice. Worker activists were pressing to expand to give
worker representatives decision-making power, but employers insisted the
role of worker voice was only consultative. The matter came to a head in
Ontario in the late 1980s and employers won the debate. Moreover, since
that time, at least one survey found that senior managers in 2001 thought
that worker involvement was less important than they did in 1990. 47
Nevertheless, institutional channels for collective worker voice in
workplace OHS management remain and may also be supported by other
programs and policies that give employers credit for worker participation,
such as accreditation.
Collective worker voice in the development of state OHS policy has
long been present and has played a particularly important role in the reforms
of the 1970s and 1980s when a militant workers’ health and safety
movement was keeping government on the defensive. 48 The Ontario
government responded by adopting tripartite and even bipartite institutional
arrangements for setting OHS standards and overseeing OHS training.
However, the high water mark of collective worker voice was reached in the
early 1990s and was rolled back by a deeply conservative government.
More recently, a Liberal government has been much more open to
consultation with organized labour but has not shown any interest in
reviving corporatist co-regulation, let alone giving workers decision-making
powers.
We have already discussed the research on the effectiveness of
collective workplace voice in regard to hazardous conditions for both
standard and precarious workers, but that analysis applies with equal force
to workplace OHS policy. Indeed, it is arguable that, other things being
equal, collective worker voice with regard to hazardous conditions is likely
to be stronger than with regard to policy insofar as hazardous conditions are
likely to also violate the law and therefore could be drawn to the attention of
46
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an inspector who could issue an order. Policy matters that go beyond
implementing regulatory requirements cannot be taken further by worker
representatives, depriving them of an important source of power to
influence employer decision-making.
Finally, although there is not a large literature examining the
effectiveness of collective worker voice in shaping state OHS policy,
resource mobilization theory has provided some useful insights for thinking
about the conditions under which interventions are more likely to be
successful. 49 First, the social structure of accumulation shapes the success
of worker mobilizations in a variety of ways. In a context in which
governments and employers accept trade unionism and the legitimacy of
state protection against dysfunctional labour market outcomes, OHS
activists are much more likely to successfully influence OHS regulation,
especially if hazardous conditions have materialized in work-related deaths,
injuries and diseases. As well, because of their greater employment security
and access to institutional resources, activists will be better able to mobilize
indigenous resources to support their campaigns. Second, the strategic
position of particular groups of workers in the economy provides another
important power resource. Groups of workers that can credibly threaten to
disrupt profit-making will not only gain the ear of their employers, but also
the state. Third, the structure of political alignments at any given time will
also influence the power of workers to have their concerns addressed. When
working class votes or the support of a labour friendly party is vital to
maintaining power, mainstream parties will be more likely to accede to
worker demands. Finally, the strategic choices made by a movement,
including the way they frame their demands and whether that frame
resonates with broadly shared discourses, may also significantly influence
its success.
This analytic framework has been applied to explain why a vibrant OHS
movement successfully campaigned to reform OHS regulation from the late
1960s to the late 1980s. It arose at a time when the Canadian state and, to a
lesser degree, Canadian employers were still committed to a cooperative, if
not quite a corporatist, philosophy and practice of governance. Trade union
49
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density was still relatively high and, even though the labour movement had
an ambiguous relationship with OHS activists because their militancy
challenged the leadership’s implicit acceptance of managerial control, the
fact of unionization provided significant job security and access to some
resources. The core of the health and safety movement was in mining and
manufacturing, sectors that played an important role in Ontario’s economy
and that could be disrupted by the actions of a militant minority. Political
alignments were beginning to fragment as a long-serving Progressive
Conservative government struggled to hold power, forming a minority
government from 1975 to 1977 and then losing power to a Liberal minority
government in 1985. Finally, the OHS movement was very effective in
framing their demands in terms that had broad resonance. The claim that
“Our health is not for sale” had particular traction in a country in which the
commodification of health and health care was widely condemned. 50
Collective worker voice in Ontario government OHS policy peaked in
the early 1990s with embrace of regulatory bipartism, which saw the
creation of labour-management structures to oversee health and safety
training and the setting of exposure limits to hazardous substances. The
election of a conservative government in 1995 brought that to an abrupt end
and labour was largely excluded from policy processes until the election of
a Liberal government in 2003. That government created a variety of
sectoral councils and recently established a Prevention Council on which
four labour representatives and one non-union worker representative sit
with four employer representatives, an independent expert and a
representative of the compensation board. 51
In Alberta, there has also recently been a move to bring workers’ voices
back into the OHS policy process. Jason Foster reports that, despite its
relatively weak position (Alberta has the lowest union density in Canada),
the labour movement was able to make modest gains through its
participation in two OHS working groups established by the government to
advise on regulatory reforms. He attributed their success to the structure of
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the process, which required consensus, and the narrowness of the
recommendations that emerged. 52
These developments suggest that despite the weakening of the
conditions for effective collective worker in the state, there is some scope
for engagement in social dialogue on OHS and that modest gains can be
made or, at the very least, hostile employer demands can be blunted. But it
is also likely that union demands for stronger OHS regulation are likely to
be moderated by the fear that strong state action would trigger an employer
backlash that could potentially cost jobs.
The ability of precarious workers to shape state OHS policy is even
more limited. Not only do they face the structural constraints that all
workers experience, but they are particularly vulnerable by virtue of their
strategic location which limits their ability to credibly threaten to disrupt the
economy. Their power would have to derive from associational strength,
and that is extremely weak. Thus it is not surprising that, for the most part,
they do not enjoy direct representation on bipartite or tripartite bodies and
depend on the labour movement to speak on their behalf. The appointment
of a member to represent non-union workers to the Ontario Prevention
Council is an exception, albeit one that might indicate growing public
awareness of the problem of precarious employment and OHS and portend
a greater willingness on the part of the labour movement to support direct
representation for these workers, provided that it does not come at the
expense of the labour movement’s delegation. Moreover, there is still
widespread rejection of the legitimacy of commodifying health and health
care and this is an important ideological resource that, perhaps, can still be
used.

4.6. Summary
The basic argument presented is that worker voice in OHS can have an
important role to play, but only under certain conditions. Those conditions
were present for some workers in a SER at the time when worker
participation was legislated in the mid-1970s, but not for all. Since that
time, those supporting conditions have become less common, particularly
for precarious workers. These conclusions are now widely shared among
52
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researchers, so the main contribution of this section is in the distinction it
makes between different channels of worker voice and its exploration of the
conditions for effective voice that are particular to each channel. By
understanding the ways in which these different channels operate, we can
better assess where and how to address the voice deficit that particularly
afflicts precarious workers. This is the task of the final section.

5. Worker Voice in the New World of Work
What, if anything, can be done to protect and enhance worker voice in
the new world of work? There are no simple solutions to a problem that is
deeply rooted in structural conditions that cannot be changed in the shortterm. So clearly, there is no point in calling for a restoration of the post-war
accord, such as it was, and the labour market arrangements and institutions
that it supported. Although the growth of precarious employment may slow,
as may the decline in union density, there is little reason to believe that in
the near future either trend will be stopped, let alone reversed. 53 Given this
challenging reality, it might be helpful to roll the discussion back one level
by asking which channels of worker voice are most likely to be opened and
made effective.
To date, much of the literature has focused on enhancing worker voice
in the employer’s OHS management system. For example, Walters and
Nichols generally recommend enacting more comprehensive and stronger
regulations requiring consultation and, for small workplaces, emulating the
Swedish system of regional health and safety representatives. 54 I will return
to these recommendations shortly, but I want to suggest that a more
promising channel of worker voice for precarious workers is in the area of
state enforcement. I take this view because I think that the prospects for
effective regulated self-regulation for precarious workers are dim and that
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despite the obstacles there is more scope for gains to be made by
strengthening state enforcement and workers’ voices in that endeavour.
The basis for this view is more fully developed in another paper
critiquing new governance approaches to OHS regulation. 55 Essentially, I
argue there that OHS regulation is beset by regulatory dilemmas that arise
because of conflicts between safety and profit. Of course safety and profit
do not always conflict and compliance strategies are most likely to succeed
in its absence. But conflict is common and when it is regulatory dilemmas
will limit the space for cooperation, except under certain conditions. Erik
Olin Wright has argued that mutually beneficial class compromise is
sometimes possible, but only when workers have sufficient organizational
and political strength to take OHS out of competition by requiring all
employers to maintain high standards. 56 Historically this situation has been
difficult to achieve, and perhaps was best realized in the Nordic countries
during the 1970s and 80s. 57 However, under conditions of globalized
production and weakened worker organization, employers have retreated
from cooperative arrangements. As a result, a primary focus on building
self-regulation with worker voice risks a regression toward neo-liberal
regulation that valorizes market-driven outcomes.
The turn toward worker voice in enforcement has been most apparent in
recent writing on the enforcement of employment standards, where scholars
have identified substantial compliance deficits. 58 Since people working at
the bottom of the labour market are almost by definition precariously
employed, researchers writing in this vein have had to confront the new
realities of the labour market more starkly than those writing about OHS,
where a greater variety of workplace situations are found and where the
SER still exists in some places. Moreover, for precarious workers,
55
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enhancing voice in an internal responsibility system for ensuring
compliance with applicable employment standards is not a sensible policy
response. In most workplaces there is no institutionalized internal
responsibility system that workers can access. Therefore, public regulation
and enforcement must be prominent in any regulatory strategy and worker
voice in enforcement is a component of a multi-pronged approach to its
improvement. 59
Jennifer Gordon and Janice Fine have been particularly helpful in
focusing attention on the role of worker voice in public enforcement. 60 They
understand that a major problem facing vulnerable workers is that they
confront numerous barriers to exercising individual voice by making
complaints either to their employers or to state regulators even though they
are legally protected against employer retaliation for doing so. Moreover,
direct collective voice is unlikely since these workers are overwhelmingly
unorganized and are unlikely to gain union representation in the near future.
Therefore, Fine and Gordon focus on third-party or community-based
enforcement, which draws upon the resources of third-party worker
representatives, like unions and workers’ centres, to gather and provide
information to inspectors and to file complaints. Based on a number of case
studies of innovative enforcement programs in the United States, Fine and
Gordon argue that for these arrangements to be successful, they must be
formalized, sustained, vigorous and well-resourced.
Their proposal partially resembles the Swedish regional safety
representative model discussed earlier insofar as it introduces a third party
into the workplace to facilitate worker voice, but it differs in at least two
important ways. First and foremost, the focus of their proposal is not to give
59
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workers voice in the firm’s internal responsibility system, but rather to open
up communication between workers and state enforcement officials. As
well, the Swedish scheme only allows regional health and safety
representatives to access unionized firms. The system works to the extent
that union coverage is the norm and worker participation is accepted. But
even in Sweden, the continued effectiveness of this approach is in doubt.
Changes in the Swedish industrial relations system and the structure of its
labour market, including the growth of more precarious forms of
employment are undermining regional safety representation. 61 In a North
American context, where private sector union coverage is very low
generally, and likely to be minimal where large numbers of vulnerable
workers are employed, and the idea that workers are entitled to a voice in
workplace decision-making is alien, it is extremely unlikely that the
Swedish model would succeed. For these reasons, Fine and Gordon
properly focus on a community-based model that aims to enhance worker
voice in public enforcement, independent of union membership.
Of course, opening this channel of worker voice is not an easy row to
hoe either. It requires collective workplace agents or institutions with both
the commitment and resources to undertake this role, and state
cooperation. 62 There are some jurisdictions in which trade unions
historically have played an active role in enforcing employment and health
and safety standards. For example, in Australia, under the awards system,
unions took the lead in ensuring that employers complied with standards.
To fulfil this role, they enjoyed a right of access to workplaces, the power to
inspect relevant documentation and standing in court to seek recovery of
wages and penalties for breaches. 63 Currently, in New South Wales,
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Australia, authorized union representatives have the right to investigate
suspected OHS offences and this has led to about 20 private prosecutions. 64
Historically, trade unions in Ontario played a similar although less
extensive role under the Industrial Standards Act (ISA), prior to its repeal.
They sat on Advisory Committees, which were established in part to
monitor employer compliance with applicable schedules. However, these
committees lacked formal enforcement powers. 65
Outside of the niches where the ISA applied, union resources were spent
servicing their bargaining units, not enforcing decrees or sectoral
agreements. However, recently, some unions are showing increased interest
in assisting unorganized precarious workers without first becoming their
certified bargaining agents. For example, the United Food and Commercial
Workers have not only tried to unionize agricultural workers, but have
supported the creation of ten support centres across Canada that provide
advice and assistance on a variety of employment related matters. The
Alberta Federation of Labour has also been active in providing support
services for temporary foreign workers through its Advocate program. 66
How much support unions can or will provide remains to be seen, especially
at a time when union densities are falling.
A second candidate to fulfil the institutional role of enhancing worker
voice in enforcement is worker centres. These centres have been growing in
the United States and Canada. Fine discusses a number of examples where
worker centres that established formal partnerships with government to
enforce minimum standards laws. They have been able to do this in part by
framing their claims in moral terms that resonate with widely shared values
and in part by working in communities with large immigrant populations
concentrated in particular industries. 67
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To my knowledge, workers’ centres in Canada have not established
formal roles in enforcement, despite some successes influencing public
policy and obtaining commitments from the government to increase their
enforcement efforts, particularly for vulnerable workers. 68 In Toronto, for
example, the Workers’ Action Centre has been an effective advocate for
temporary agency and other vulnerable workers.
A third candidate is legal and occupational health and safety clinics.
Although to my knowledge there is no history of clinics playing such a role,
there is an existing institutional infrastructure that could be developed to
involve them in enforcement. On the legal side, there is the Workers’ Health
and Safety Legal Clinic in Toronto, Ontario, that is funded by Legal Aid
Ontario. Its mandate is to provide legal services to non-unionized workers
who have health and safety concerns. As well, there is a network of
occupational health and safety clinics across the province of Ontario that
provide OHS services to workers. Because their current focus is primarily to
identify OHS hazards and provide information to workers, employers and
the public, enhancing worker voice in enforcement might be seen as
counter-productive, but it may be possible to build on this institution. 69
Whether these or other institutions to enhance workers’ collective voice
in OHS enforcement can be developed is an open question. With the
exception of protections against non-payment of wage, workers obtained
OHS regulation before other minimum standards, for the reason that it was
widely perceived as unjust for workers to be exposed to excessively
hazardous conditions. The OHS movement of the 1970s and 1980s was very
successful in framing their claims in moral terms that rejected the
legitimacy of commodifying workers’ health. 70 As we noted, in the
regulatory regimes that were created in the late twentieth century, worker
voice was emphasized, but it was primarily located in the internal
responsibility system, which was to be the principal site for improving OHS
management and securing compliance with OHS standards. Since that time,
there has been a shift in Ontario away from a compliance approach that
emphasizes the promotion of self-regulation through the internal
responsibility system toward direct enforcement of state standards.
Expanding the role of worker voice in regulatory enforcement would be
68
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consistent with this change of emphasis. Moreover, it might also be possible
to argue that community-based enforcement, at least in selected areas where
conventional inspection systems are particularly weak, would increase state
capacity at relatively low cost.
Is this possible? There is a window of opportunity in Ontario. On
Christmas Eve 2009, four migrant workers died when the scaffold they were
working on collapsed. In the aftermath, the Ontario government appointed
an expert advisory panel, chaired by Tony Dean. Among the eleven priority
recommendations in the Dean report was to establish a special committee
under s. 21 of the OHSA to provide the Minister of Labour with advice on
the protection of vulnerable workers. 71 Unfortunately, as of the time of
writing, the committee has not yet been struck, but the government remains
committed to carrying out this recommendation and it may provide some
space within which to promote new and experimental approaches to
enforcement for this group. In August 2012 the Law Commission of Ontario
issued its Interim Report on Vulnerable Workers, which made a number of
recommendations to address the problems vulnerable workers face. In
particular, it recommended that the government identify the sectors where
vulnerable workers are concentrated (agriculture, hospitality and cleaning,
workplaces with temporary agency staffing) and prioritize them for
proactive inspection. As well, it recommended that temporary foreign
workers in all sectors be a priority. It did not, however, make any
recommendations for enhancing worker voice in OHS enforcement,
although it did suggest making provision for third-party complaints with
respect to employment standards violations. 72
In conclusion, we can only speculate about the contribution that voice
might make to the protection of vulnerable workers from hazardous
working conditions. We know that under certain conditions voice can be an
important component of an effective system of OHS regulation. We also
know that the changing political economy is undermining the conditions for
worker participation at the firm level and the capacity and commitment of
71
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states to directly regulate of hazardous working conditions. In these
circumstances, probably the most that can be done is to identify multiple
pressure points on governments and firms and to enhance the channels of
worker voice where and whenever it is possible to do so. Worker voice
rights, whether in the workplace, the state or intermediate institutions, have
never been granted without struggle. In this context, pressuring government
to provide workers a stronger voice in pubic OHS enforcement is a strategy
that should be tried.
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